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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant

to

Section

78-4-11, Utah

Code

Annotated.

(1953 as

amended), and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL

Whether or not the State established, by clear and convincing
evidence, the Corpus Delicti of the crime charged, independently
of the Defendant's admission to operating the motor vehicle in
question, when evidence at trial indicated as follows:

that the

driver of the vehicle left his lane, crossed over the highway
median strip, and rolled the vehicle; that the vehicle came to rest
on the passenger side; that an unidentified man exited from the
driver's window and fled the scene; that a second occupant of the
vehicle received mortal injuries to the head; that the first
persons on the scene found the injured occupant trapped underneath
the passenger side of the vehicle and rolled the vehicle back to
an upright position; that there was blood on the ground where the
passenger window of the vehicle initially came to rest; that there
was a strong odor of alcohol in the vehicle; and that open and
closed beer cans were in the vehicle and strewn along the path
where the vehicle rolled.

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

A.

Section 41-6-29, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)

states as follows:
1)
The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident
resulting in injury or death of any person shall
immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident
or as close to it as possible and shall immediately
return to and remain at the scene until he has fulfilled
the requirements of Section 41-6-31. The stop may not
obstruct traffic more than is necessary.
B.

Section 41-2-136, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)

states as follows:
1)
A person whose licence has been denied, suspended,
disqualified, or revoked under this chapter or under the
laws of the state in which his license was issued and who
operates any motor vehicle upon the highways of the state
while that licence is denied, suspended, disqualified,
or revoked shall be punished as provided in this section.
2)
A person convicted of violation of Subsection 1 ) ,
other than a violation specified in Subsection 3 ) , is
guilty of a class c. misdemeanor.
3)
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose
conviction under subsection 1) is based on his operation
a vehicle while his license is suspended, disqualified,
or revoked for:
i)
a refusal to submit to a chemical test under
Section 41-6-44.10;
ii)
C.

a violation of Section 44-6-44.

Section 41-6-63.10(2), Utah Code Annotated

(1953 as

amended) states as follows:
2)
A vehicle may not be operated over, across, or
within any dividing space, median, or barrier of a
divided highway, except where authorized by an official
traffic-control device or peace officer.
2

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The State hereby adopts and stipulates to the defendant's
version of the Nature of the Proceedings as follows:
Defendant appeals his conviction for a Class A misdemeanor,
in violation of Section 41-6-29, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended), and for a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Section
41-2-136, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).

On November 15,

1991, Defendant was committed to serve 30 days in jail due to his
conviction of the above charges. On November 21, 1991, Defendant
filed a motion for a new trial. The trial court issued an unsigned
minute entry granting the motion and ordering the guilty verdict
set aside.

On January 30, 1992, the court found the Defendant

guilty on both counts.

On March 26, 1992, Defendant appeared for

sentencing, and the court sentenced the Defendant in an unsigned
order.

On May 6, 1992, the court held a hearing to review the

sentence and stayed sentence for thirty days in case Defendant
wanted to appeal. The Defendant filed his notice to appeal on May
8, 1992.

Because the unsigned minute order did not constitute a

final order, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on
September 15, 1992.

A second notice of appeal was filed on

November 9, 1992.
Trial in this case was held on January 30, 1992.

At the

conclusion of the state's evidence, the Defendant moved for a
dismissal of both counts, arguing that the State had not met its

3

burden

to

establish

the

corpus

delicti

of

the

crimes

by

independent, clear and convincing evidence prior to admitting the
Defendant's confession.
court

on

the

corpus

The Defendant had previously briefed the
delicti

issue.

The

court

denied

the

Defendant's motion to dismiss and ruled that there was sufficient
corroborating evidence to allow the Defendant's confession and the
corroborating evidence could be taken together to establish the
corpus delicti of the crime, thereby allowing the confession to be
used for the further purpose of establishing identity of the
criminal agent.

The Defendant then notified the court of his

intent to appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The State hereby adopts and stipulates to the Defendant's
Statement of the Case as follows:
Mr. Hansen was tried and convicted at bench trial on January
30, 1992, of leaving the scene of an injury accident and driving
with a suspended license. Independent of Mr. Hansen's confession,
.... evidence presented by the State showed that a single car
rollover occurred on 1-15 on September 7, 1991, that the car came
to rest on the passenger side of the car, that the only available
exit from the car was the driver's door, that an unidentified man
in a blue jacket and red shirt was seen climbing up and out of that
door, and that no witnesses could testify as to whether the man was
the operator or the passenger. The same man went to a nearby grove
4

of trees, then recrossed the highway and hitchhiked north.

There

was a second occupant in the car at the time of the accident and
he was thrown from the vehicle and received mortal injuries to the
head.
Approximately 25 hours later police arrested David Laird
Hansen, who was wearing clothes similar to those described by
witnesses on the day before. The State's witness did not identify
Mr. Hansen as the person who exited the vehicle, beyond a general
description of his clothing and the fact that he had a small cut
on his hand.

Mr. Hansen was arrested after a car in which he was

a passenger was pulled over on 1-15 more than 24 hours after the
accident. During the subsequent questioning by police, Mr. Hansen
stated that he had been driving the car at the time of the
accident.
In addition to the foregoing facts as set forth in the
Defendant's brief, the State established the following facts,
independently of the Defendant's confessions:

The driver of the

vehicle left his lane, crossed completely over the 1-15 median
strip, and rolled the vehicle (See p. 5 line 13, through p. 6 line
9; and p. 36 lines 1-6, of the Trial Transcript); the first persons
to arrive at the scene of the accident found the injured occupant
trapped underneath the passenger side of the vehicle and rolled the
vehicle back to an upright position, and blood was found on the
ground where the passenger window of the vehicle initially came to
rest (See p. 8 line 25, through p. 9 line 7; and p. 38 line 11,
through p. 39 line 11, of the Trial Transcript); there was a strong
5

odor of alcohol in the vehicle, and there were open and closed beer
cans in the vehicle and strewn along the path where the vehicle
rolled (See p. 10 lines 5-7; and p. 39 lines 5-7, of the Trial
Transcript);

on September 7, 1991, the Defendant's driver's

licence was suspended for previous alcohol violations.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Corpus Delicti rule requires that the State establish, by
clear and convincing evidence independent of the Defendant's
confession, that an injury occurred, and that such injury was
caused by someone's criminal conduct.
One basis for sufficiency of the State's evidence under the
Corpus Delicti rule in this case is that there was an accident with
a mortally injured occupant of the vehicle.

The criminal agency

which caused that injury was the illegal crossing of a median strip
by the driver of the vehicle.
Another basis for the sufficiency of the State's evidence
under the Corpus Delicti rule in this case requires that the State
establish criminality_where one of the vehicle's occupants fled the
scene of the accident and left his mortally injured companion.
Criminality in that situation, of course, requires the State to
establish that the person who fled the scene was the driver of the
vehicle. Otherwise, there would have been no crime in fleeing the
scene.

6

The State has established, by clear and convincing evidence
independent of the Defendant's confession, that 1) a person was
mortally injured in an accident, a cause of which was the illegal
act of crossing a highway median by the driver, whoever it was;
and 2) that the driver of the vehicle fled the scene immediately
after the accident, leaving the vehicle and the mortally injured
passenger.
Under either one of those two factual scenarios, the State has
established the corpus delicti necessary for the allowance of the
Defendants confessions into evidence at trial.

ARGUMENT

The State did establish at trial, by clear and convincing
evidence, the corpus delicti of the crimes committed, independently
of the Defendant's confessions. The independent evidence indicates
that a wrong or injury was committed, and that the wrong or injury
was caused by a criminal agency.
In State v. Johnson.

821 P.2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1992), the

corpus delicti rule is defined as follows:
"The corpus delicti rule states that before a defendant's
inculpatory statements can be introduced as evidence against
the defendant, the State must prove the occurrence of a crime,
i.e., a corpus delicti... (citations omitted) The rule is
designed as a 'safeguard against convicting the innocent on
the strength of false confessions.'" (citations omitted)
The Johnson Court then goes on to set forth the elements of
the corpus delicti rule:

7

"Corpus delicti must be established through evidence
independent of the confession or admission, that 'the injuries
specified... occurred, and that such injury was caused by
someone's criminal conduct.'11 (citations omitted) (Id.)
The Johnson Court restated those elements as requirements of
previous cases.

"Our past cases have consistently required that

the independent evidence show two things: 1) 'that a wrong, and
injury, or a damage has been done,' and 2) 'that such was effected
by a criminal agency, i.e., without right or by unlawful means.'"
(citations omitted) (Id.)
Independent of the defendant's confession, the State offered
evidence, certainly reaching the clear and convincing standard
required under Johnson (See Id. at 1163), as to every element of
the

charges

except, perhaps, for the

identification

of

the

Defendant as the criminal actor. However, proof of identification
is not required to establish a corpus delicti. Johnson states that
"under

our

prior

cases

the

State

is not

required

to

show

independent evidence 'that the accused is the guilty agent.'"
(citations omitted) (Id. at 1162).
In Defendant's brief, counsel seems to argue that the State
must establish, by clear and convincing evidence independent of the
Defendant's confession, every element of the crimes charged. This,
however, does not comport with the corpus delicti requirements of
Johnson as set forth above.

The State need only establish that

there was an injury, and that the injury was caused by someone's
criminal conduct.

8

The injury in this case could be either the mortal injury
received by the one occupant of the vehicle, or the leaving of the
mortally injured man by the other occupant.

The criminal conduct

which was a cause of the mortal injury, would be the illegal
crossing of the highway median by the driver, whoever it was, as
prohibited in Section 41-6-63.10(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
Amended).

Though such criminal conduct does seem a bit removed

from the crimes actually charged, it very well could have been
charged. Furthermore, such conduct arose out of the same incident
which formed the factual basis for the charges which were brought.
And in order to obtain a conviction for the illegal operation of
a vehicle in the median, and for a conviction of the other crimes
actually charged, a common required element the State would need
to establish for each of those crimes, would be the identification
of the Defendant as the driver. Thus, if the State has established
at trial a corpus delicti for any one of those factually related
crimes, it should be allowed to use the Defendant's confession as
evidence to establish elements for all of those crimes. After all,
the corpus delicti cases require only proof of the occurrence of
"a" crime. (See Johnson at 1162)

And where the crimes arise out

of the same incident, there is little danger of conviction upon a
false confession.
The criminal conduct involved in leaving the scene of an
accident which involves a mortal injury is, of course, obvious;
providing that the person leaving the scene was the driver.

And

to establish a corpus delicti under this particular injury—
9

criminal conduct scenario, the State concedes that the there must
be a showing by clear and convincing evidence, independent of the
Defendant's confession, that the person who left the scene of the
accident was the driver. That is because if it was the driver who
was mortally injured, and it was the passenger who left the scene,
there is no crime for which the passenger could be convicted. And
thus,

the

criminal

connection

to

the

injury

could

not

be

established.
The State's evidence in this case, however, sufficiently
establishes that the person who left the scene of the accident was
the driver.

The evidence indicates that the vehicle rolled and

came to rest on the passenger side, that the injured person was
trapped underneath the passenger side and had received mortal
injuries to the head, that blood was found where the passenger
window of the vehicle came to rest, and that the other occupant of
the vehicle exited from the driver's window shortly after the
accident.

All of this evidence indicates that the person who

exited the vehicle was the driver.

Additionally, the evidence

shows that the person who exited the vehicle fled the scene, that
there was an odor of alcohol in the vehicle, and that beer cans
were scattered in the vehicle and strewn along the path of the
vehicle as it rolled. A reasonable factual inference can be drawn
from those facts that the person exiting the vehicle was the
driver.

That is because if he were a passenger, neither he, nor

any reasonable person under the same circumstances, would have a
compelling reason to flee the scene.
XO

Whereas if he were the

driver, the presence of the alcohol, together with his operation
of the vehicle, the occurrence of an accident, and the resulting
mortal injury to the passenger, would give him a very strong motive
to flee the scene.
As for establishing the corpus delicti for the Driving on
Suspension charge, it is the State's position, as set forth above,
that if a corpus delicti is established for any crime at trial, the
Defendant's testimony may be used at such trial to establish the
elements of any other crime which arises out of the same incident
as the crime for which a corpus delicti has been established.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that
this Court affirm the Trial Court's conviction of the Defendant in
this matter.

A
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this If)

dav of March, 1993.

Benjamin/T. Davis
Deputy i6tah County Attorney
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I hereby certify that I mailed 2 true and correct copies of
the foregoing BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE to Cleve J. Hatch, Public
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day of March, 1993.
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